LHC rules criticism alone not derogatory language under lawyers act

The Lahore High Court has held that mere criticism, disagreement or discourtesy by a public officer does not by itself amount to "derogatory language" under the Lawyers Welfare and Protection Act, 2023, and has set aside an order that had directed police to register an FIR against a serving Federal Board of Revenue commissioner.

Justice Tariq Saleem Sheikh allowed the petition, WP No. 2344/2026 (Fakhriya Anjum vs Inspector General of Police, Punjab and others), and quashed the order of the Ex-officio Justice of Peace, Lahore, dated 3 January 2026, which had directed the SHO of Civil Lines police station to register a case against her. The complainant advocate's application under sections 22-A and 22-B of the Cr.P.C. was dismissed.

The dispute began with a complaint filed before the Federal Tax Ombudsman over the adjustment of an income tax refund against a sales tax demand. The petitioner, then commissioner inland revenue in Islamabad, filed departmental comments in the matter. The advocate objected to two passages in those comments (one warning of "severe consequences", the other referring to "legal action against the lawyer which he seems to have forgotten") calling them an attempt to intimidate him, and sought an FIR under the 2023 act and the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act.

Giving "derogatory language" its ordinary meaning, the court said the phrase applies to language that, in context, disparages, demeans or belittles the person addressed. "Mere criticism, disagreement or discourtesy does not by itself answer that description," it held.

Reading the two passages in context, the court found that the first criticised the accusation made against the officer and pointed to possible legal consequences rather than disparaging the advocate. The second it described as "personal and pointed" and possibly discourteous, but not derogatory.

On PECA, the judgment held that investigation of such offences lies with the National Cyber Crime Investigation Agency under sections 29 and 30 of the law, so a direction to a station house officer to register an FIR for a PECA offence could not lawfully be made. Reputational harm cannot substitute for the elements of the offence, the court said.

The court left undecided the questions of territorial jurisdiction, the protections available under section 227(2) and section 197 of the Cr.P.C., and whether section 15 of the 2023 act overrides them.

The judgment states that nothing in it approves the tenor of the petitioner's official response, and that public officers appearing before judicial or quasi-judicial forums are expected to maintain restraint and institutional propriety.